

477 Prospect St
APT 1L
New Haven, CT, 06511

michael-david.mangini@yale.edu
(T) (203) 788-5545
michaeldavidmangini.com

Michael-David Mangini

Postdoctoral Fellow at the Leitner Program in Comparative and International Political Economy
Yale University

1 Appointments

2022 Postdoctoral Fellow at the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance
Princeton University

2 Education

Ph.D. 2022 in Political Economy and Government
Harvard University

M.A. 2018 in Political Economy and Government
Harvard University

B.A. May 2014 *summa cum laude* in Economics and International Relations
University of Pennsylvania

3 Publications

Mangini, Michael-David. **“Escape from Tariffs: The Political Economies of Protection and Classification.”** *Economics & Politics* (2022). <https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12244>

Abstract: The literature on the political economy of trade protection has focused on how firms lobby for their preferred tariffs, but opportunities to change the tariff schedule in the United States by legislation are relatively uncommon. How can importers lobbying in their private capacity escape from tariffs without relying on Congress? In the United States, products must be sorted into tariff categories by the customs office before the appropriate duty can be determined. This article documents how firms seek to lower their tariffs by strategically requesting product classifications from customs. Firms hire lawyers to make legal arguments to customs officials promoting an interpretation of the tariff schedule which lowers their costs. Lobbying for favorable classification is most important to the firm when similar categories have very different tariffs. The language of product descriptions is political because legal arguments for a particular classification are more persuasive when the descriptions are worded flexibly. Using a data set of over 200,000 classification rulings between 1990 and 2020, I find evidence that firms request classifications in response to certain quotas and the China tariffs. The findings characterize the tariff schedule as a living document and describe how the distribution of tariffs and the language of product descriptions affect the structure of protection.

Mangini, Michael-David. "The Economic Coercion Trilemma". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (2023). <https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231191530>

Abstract: States often use market access as a bargaining chip in international politics. A state that requires simultaneous compliance in multiple issue areas before granting market access maximizes incentives to comply but also makes them brittle – any targeted states that cannot comply in one issue area have no incentive to comply in any. More generally, programs of economic coercion can achieve at most two of the following three objectives: 1) secure a broad coalition of domestic political support, 2) the association of meaningful trade value with each policy issue, and 3) assurance that enforcing one political issue will not reduce the target's incentives to comply with conditionality on others. Characteristics of the program's domestic constituency, of the issues themselves, and of the international economy are key determinants of how the state prioritizes the three objectives. The trilemma explains the number and types of issues that can be linked to economic value.

4 Working papers

How Effective is Trade Conditionality? Economic Coercion in the Generalized System of Preferences

Conditional Acceptance, Review of International Organizations

Abstract: States often receive threats of economic coercion only after committing some transgression. While attention has been given to strategic selection in the imposition of sanctions – the notion that sanctions are imposed only after the threat of sanctions has failed to elicit compliance – selection also occurs at the threat stage. Does the possibility of economic coercion incentivize states to stay in line before they are directly threatened? This article makes two contributions. First, it presents a theory showing how the interaction between different types of threats can alter the strategic context of economic coercion in ways that potentially reverse the results of empirical analysis. It explains that states are likely to issue general threats, or threats targeting the behavior of a group of countries, when sanctions effectiveness is unknown or the identity of noncompliers is difficult to predict. Second, using quasi-experimental techniques, this article demonstrates that states actively manage the risk of losing access to a trade preference program by altering their policies. The article indicates the political consequences of economic linkages may be more extensive than previously believed.

Robots, Foreigners, and Foreign Robots: Policy Responses to Automation and Trade (with Stephen Chaudoin)

Revise and Resubmit, Journal of Politics

Presented at GRIPE in August 2021, IPES in October 2022

Abstract: We develop a general model of a citizen's demand for policy responses to redistributive shocks like globalization and automation. The model illustrates how a dislike for imports can increase demand for policy responses that 'backpedal' against the shock, such as automation regulation and tariffs, relative to demand for *ex post* transfers. We use survey experimental evidence from two different designs to support the model's predictions. Treatments emphasizing an automation shock from domestic-origin technology cause citizens to place greater weight on redistribution relative to regulations (backpedaling against automation). A foreign-origin labor shock, e.g. firms moving production abroad, leads to greater weight on protectionism (backpedaling against globalization), which also crowds out demand for redistribution. Most importantly, "making automation foreign" by emphasizing foreign-origin technology re-weights responses towards greater support for regulations

and away from redistribution. Our findings explain how support for automation regulations could grow, as politicians increasingly vilify foreign technology.

Coalitions and the Politics of Restraint: Evidence from the Iran Deal Negotiation

Under Review

Presented at Harvard International Relations and Political Economy workshops

Abstract: Economic coercion depends on the credibility of both threats to punish noncompliance and assurances that compliance will not be punished. What instruments can states deploy to make the necessary assurances without undermining the credibility of their threats? This article describes how some factors that bolster the credibility of threats can simultaneously undermine the credibility of assurances. It then argues that states can mitigate the challenge by carefully selecting coalition partners with different interests who can hold them accountable. The paper applies the theory to the Iran deal negotiation and finds that Congressional resolve to maintain sanctions initially stymied progress. The United States was ultimately able to increase the believability of its commitments by partnering with European states that were more open to removing sanctions.

Conflict Technology as a Catalyst of State Formation: Urban Fortifications in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (with Casey Petroff)

Under Review

Honorable Mention for Best Poster at the Harvard Government Department Poster Session

We argue that the gunpowder revolution in medieval Europe encouraged the amalgamation of smaller polities into larger centralized states. The shock to military technology made existing fortifications obsolete and dramatically raised the cost of defensive investments. Small polities lacked the fiscal capacity to make these investments, so they had either to ally or merge with others. Alliances created prospects of free-riding by interior cities on border cities. In contrast, unitary centralized states benefited from geographic and fiscal economies of scale, facilitating defensive investments at the border that protected the interior while limiting free-riding and resource misallocation. Using a new dataset on fortifications in over 6,000 European cities, we find that states made defensive investments in areas of territorial contestation, closer to borders, and farther from raw building materials. These findings are consistent with the theory that large centralized states arose in part as a consequence of changes in military technology.

5 Honors and Awards

2020	Graduate Student Associate of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs
2018-2020	Graduate Student Associate of the Institute for Quantitative Social Science
2019	Harvard Kennedy School Distinction in Teaching Award (for masters level microeconomics)
2018	Harvard Distinction in Teaching Award (for PhD level microeconomics)
2014	Joseph Warner Yardley Prize The Yardley Prize is awarded to the best thesis on political economy by a senior in any undergraduate school at Penn. Awarded for the thesis titled, "A Tale of Two Controversies: Impact of IMF Bias on Moral Hazard 1990-2010."
2014	Erik Arnetz Integrating Knowledge Award Awarded to an International Relations major whose "ingenuity, initiative, creativity, and academic

achievement exemplify the values of connecting research to practice throughout the entirety of their classroom study, internship and work experience, research opportunities, and thesis writing.”

- 2014 Phi Beta Kappa inductee
- 2010 Benjamin Franklin Scholars Program
- 2012 Special Delegate to West Point SCUSA Conference on International Affairs and Public Policy

6 Professional Experience

Fall Semester Instructor, Yale University, PLSC 124/673: International Conflict

Spring Semester Instructor, Yale University, PLSC 147/681: Coercion in the Globalized Economy

Aug 2017 - May 2022

Teaching Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School and the Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences

- BGP610: The Political Economy of Trade (for Professor Robert Z. Lawrence). Masters of Public Policy and Masters of Public Administration students.
- Econ1400: The Future of Globalization (for Professors Robert Z. Lawrence and Lawrence H. Summers). Undergraduate students.
- Gov40: Introduction to International Relations (for Professors Dustin Tingley and Stephen Chaudoin). Undergraduate students.
- Econ2020a: Microeconomic Theory (for Professor Maciej Kotowski). PhD students.
- Gov1780: International Political Economy (for Professor Jeffrey Frieden). Undergraduate students.
- API101: Markets and Market Failure (for Professors Pinar Dogan, David Ellwood, Janina Matuszeski, and Marcella Alsan). Masters of Public Policy students.

March 2019 - July 2019

Research Assistant to Professors Josh Kertzer and Marcus Holmes

- Reviewed the political economy literature on the problem of conceptualizing the aggregation of preferences and biases of individuals.

July 2016 - Feb 2017

Research Assistant to Professor Dani Rodrik

- Assisted the construction and analysis of an original dataset on the rise of populism and its connection to globalization.

Mar 2014 - May 2015

Bates White Economic Consulting
Consultant

- Analyzed economic datasets using econometric techniques and briefed senior consultants on the results.

- Conducted damages and penalties analysis with an expert in corporate litigation involving pharmaceutical pricing and marketing using Stata and SQL.
- Supported an expert in analyzing the economics of blood plasma donation.
- Contributed to expert witness deposition preparation.

Jun 2011 - Feb 2013

International Assessment and Strategy Center
Research Assistant to Professor Anne-Louise Antonoff

- Project 2030: An analysis of international trends through the year 2030 in critical infrastructure and resource management. Studied cyber-security, rare earth metals, international finance trends, energy technology, and many other trends for a major report on issues and concerns anticipating 2030.
- Transnational Organized Crime: Researched and wrote reports on various aspects of transnational organized crime. Specifically, the team studied the crime-terror nexus and the relationship between ungoverned physical spaces and crime. The territories of Mexico, Russia, Italy, Afghanistan, Ghana, Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, and others formed the foundation for case studies.

7 General Skills

- Software: R, L^AT_EX, Qualtrics, Stata, MATLAB
- Language: Italian