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Michael-David Mangini

PhD Candidate in Political Economy and Government

Government Track

Harvard University

1 Education

B.A. May 2014 *summa cum laude* in Economics and International Relations
University of Pennsylvania

2 Working papers

2019-2021 **Escape from Tariffs: The Political Economies of Protection and Classification**

Under Review

Abstract: Firms avoid paying the costs of protection in many ways – their actions lobbying against tariffs or relocating production are well known. What is the political economy of protection between opportunities to change the tariff schedule? This paper reveals another escape path through administrative lobbying to redefine products. Import-dependent firms seek lower tariffs by requesting that their products be classified into categories of the tariff schedule with lower duties. When firms substitute lobbying resources away from the determination of tariffs and towards the classification of their products, they undermine collective action because the narrow scope of the rulings delivers a private benefit to the firm. Using a unique dataset of over 200,000 classification rulings by US customs officials between 1990 and 2020, I find evidence that firms request classifications in response to rising protection. In particular, demand for classification rulings rose in response to textile quotas and President Donald Trump’s tariffs on Chinese products. Classification requests are also concentrated in tariff headings that contain high variance in tariff rates. The empirical patterns suggest that firms treat lobbying over tariff levels and lobbying over tariff classification as strategic substitutes.

2020-2021 **The Economic Coercion Trilemma**

Under Review

Abstract: WStates blessed with strong economies often leverage their position for political gain using conditionality: they withhold market access

from any state that does not embrace specific policies. Programs of conditionality are staggeringly diverse, varying the types of issues tied to market access, the amount of market access connected to each issue, and the degree of compliance required for access. What factors limit the number and types of political issues that can be linked to market access? Using a formal model I show how the design of conditionality is constrained by an underlying economic coercion trilemma. Programs of economic coercion can achieve at most two of the following three objectives: 1) a broad coalition of support for conditionality from multiple interest groups whose issues are linked to trade, 2) the maximum trade value possible being tied to each issue, and 3) consistent enforcement across issues. I show that states will benefit from tying multiple political issues to a single commercial volume when simultaneous noncompliance on multiple issues is unlikely. I also show how the optimal program design varies with the degree of dependence on trade. Finally, I describe how the trilemma is applied to historical and modern examples of economic coercion.

2017-2021

The Limits of Resolve in International Politics: Evidence from the Iran Deal Negotiation

Under Review

Abstract: Trade conditionality as an instrument of economic coercion depends on the credibility of threats to revoke market access from target states that do not fulfill the conditionality. But it is equally important to credibly promise that sanctions will not be imposed on target states that do fulfill the conditionality. What instruments can states deploy to make credible promises without undermining the credibility of their threats? I show how excessive demonstrations of resolve to impose sanctions can undermine the credibility of assurances that market access will be restored once conditionality is met. The theory proposes that states can overcome these challenges by carefully choosing coalition partners who can supplement the credibility of assurances. The paper applies the theory to the Iran deal negotiation and finds that Congressional resolve to maintain sanctions stymied progress. Partnership between the United States and European states having less commitment to sanctions enhanced the effectiveness of trade conditionality and enabled the successful conclusion of the negotiations.

2018-2021

When Do Trade Relations Shape Behavior? Influence in the Context of the US Generalized System of Preferences

In progress

Abstract: Is trade conditionality effective at influencing the policies of foreign states or can it only be explained as an expression of domestic politics? This paper evaluates the effectiveness of conditionality under the US Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) at causing beneficiary states to change policy. The program offers beneficiary developing countries the opportunity to export a wide variety of goods duty free to the US, but eligibility for the program is conditional on respect for labor and intellec-

tual property rights. Using a panel dataset and a differences-in-differences framework I find evidence that the US enforces the conditionality sincerely and that states respond accordingly. Leveraging exogenous variation from administrative discontinuities in the GSP authorizing statute, I find that states who gain more from GSP membership also implement more compliant policies. The evidence suggests that the US is both sufficiently able to commit to the conditionality and a sufficiently important market for domestic states to cause them to change policies.

2019-2021

Why Populists Neglect Automation: The Political Economy of Economic Dislocation (with Stephen Chaudoin)

In Progress

Abstract: Why do populists emphasize offshoring as a cause of manufacturing job losses when automation is at least as significant a culprit? Why have voters predominantly responded to automation and offshoring shocks by demanding a retreat from globalization but not transfers to the unemployed? We propose that both questions are explained by the collision of economic nationalism and comparative advantage trade. Economic nationalists who value their state's self-sufficiency are hesitant to support policies that could hamper their own state's comparative advantage industries, like regulations of high-tech automation. They are more comfortable with tariffs restricting imports. In the United States, which has a comparative advantage in the production of capital intensive automation technologies, this effect undercuts the willingness of voters to support policies that would protect manufacturing jobs by reducing the ability of American firms to sell technology. Opportunistic populist politicians emphasize offshoring because economic nationalist voters are unified in their support for limiting imports but divided in their support for limiting automation. We develop a formal model of nationalist demand for policy in response to economic dislocation, where citizens form preferences over redistribution plans and a policy response that blunts dislocation (like a tariff or a restriction on automation). The source (foreign versus domestic) and type (labor versus automation) of a shock affects the preferred weights citizens place on each policy. We test the model's predictions with a survey experiment fielded in the United States. Consistent with expectations, domestic automation shocks increase the weight respondents place on redistribution versus a regulatory response, while globalization shocks place much heavier weight on regulatory (tariff) responses. Altering the source of each shock - by emphasizing foreign-produced automation technology or within-country labor relocation - reweights responses towards regulations in the former case and redistribution in the latter case. Our findings contribute to our understanding of the political consequences of the current populist moment as well as the future consequences and remedies for automation shocks.

2018-2021

Conflict Technology as a Catalyst of State Formation: Urban Fortifications in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (with Casey

Petroff)

In progress

Honorable Mention for Best Poster at the Harvard Government Department Poster Session

The rise of the modern European state coincided with the arrival of a new technology, artillery, that changed the balance of offensive vs. defensive capabilities. What role did this technological shift play in the development of centralized nation-states? We propose a theory of how the Gunpowder Revolution encouraged European political entities to cede sovereignty to proto-states in exchange for security by significantly raising the costs of defense. States could provide defenses more efficiently by coordinating resources, constructing defenses in strategic locations, and wielding authority to alleviate collective action problems. We test our theory empirically with data on the locations of early European gun manufacture and on the fortifications of over 4,000 European localities.

3 Invited Talks

2020 American Political Science Association

2020 International Political Economy Society

2018-2020 Seminar Presentations at Harvard

4 Honors and Awards

2020 Graduate Student Associate of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs

2018-2020 Graduate Student Associate of the Institute for Quantitative Social Science

2019 Harvard Kennedy School Distinction in Teaching Award (for masters level microeconomics)

2018 Harvard Distinction in Teaching Award (for PhD level microeconomics)

2014 JOSEPH WARNER YARDLEY PRIZE

The Yardley Prize is awarded to the best thesis on political economy by a senior in any undergraduate school at Penn. Awarded for the thesis titled, "A Tale of Two Controversies: Impact of IMF Bias on Moral Hazard 1990-2010."

2014 ERIK ARNETZ INTEGRATING KNOWLEDGE AWARD

Awarded to an International Relations major whose "ingenuity, initiative, creativity, and academic achievement exemplify the values of connecting research to practice throughout the entirety of their classroom study, internship and work experience, research opportunities, and thesis writing."

2014	Phi Beta Kappa inductee
2010	Benjamin Franklin Scholars Program
2012	Special Delegate to West Point SCUSA Conference on International Affairs and Public Policy

5 Professional Experience

Aug 2017 - Present

Teaching Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School and the Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences

- BGP610: The Political Economy of Trade (for Professor Robert Z. Lawrence). Masters of Public Policy and Masters of Public Administration students.
- Econ1400: The Future of Globalization (for Professors Robert Z. Lawrence and Lawrence H. Summers). Undergraduate students.
- Gov40: Introduction to International Relations (for Professors Dustin Tingley and Stephen Chaudoin). Undergraduate students.
- Econ2020a: Microeconomic Theory (for Professor Maciej Kotowski). PhD students.
- Gov1780: International Political Economy (for Professor Jeffrey Frieden). Undergraduate students.
- API101: Markets and Market Failure (for Professors Pinar Dogan, David Ellwood, Janina Matuszeski, and Marcella Alsan). Masters of Public Policy students.

March 2019 - July 2019

Research Assistant to Professors Josh Kertzer and Marcus Holmes

- Reviewed the political economy literature on the problem of conceptualizing the aggregation of preferences and biases of individuals.

July 2016 - Feb 2017

Research Assistant to Professor Dani Rodrik

- Assisted the construction and analysis of an original dataset on the rise of populism and its connection to globalization.

Mar 2014 - May 2015

Bates White Economic Consulting
Consultant

- Analyzed economic datasets using econometric techniques and briefed senior consultants on the results.

- Conducted damages and penalties analysis with an expert in corporate litigation involving pharmaceutical pricing and marketing using Stata and SQL.
- Supported an expert in analyzing the economics of blood plasma donation.
- Contributed to expert witness deposition preparation.

Jun 2011 - Feb 2013

International Assessment and Strategy Center
Research Assistant to Professor Anne-Louise Antonoff

- Project 2030: An analysis of international trends through the year 2030 in critical infrastructure and resource management. Studied cyber-security, rare earth metals, international finance trends, energy technology, and many other trends for a major report on issues and concerns anticipating 2030.
- Transnational Organized Crime: Researched and wrote reports on various aspects of transnational organized crime. Specifically, the team studied the crime-terror nexus and the relationship between ungoverned physical spaces and crime. The territories of Mexico, Russia, Italy, Afghanistan, Ghana, Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, and others formed the foundation for case studies.

6 General Skills

- Software: R, L^AT_EX, Qualtrics, Stata, MATLAB
- Language: Italian